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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-First Amendment-Television and
Radio Commentators' Freedom of Speech Not Infringed by
Dues Requirement of Union Shop Agreement. Buckley v. American Federationof Television and Radio Artists, 496 F.2d 305 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 688 (1974).
Plaintiffs, prominent television and radio commentators, were
compelled to pay union dues and join the American Federation of
Television and Radio Artists (AFTRA) as a condition precedent to
their public broadcasts.' Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that this union shop requirement had a "chilling
effect" upon the exercise of free speech 2 and thus violated the first
1. Evans v. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 354 F. Supp.
823, 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Buckley v. American Fed'n of
Television & Radio Artists, 496 F.2d 305 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct.
688 (1974). For a discussion of the pertinent contractual provisions, see
354 F. Supp. at 829; note 12 infra and accompanying text. While the cases
of the respective plaintiffs were consolidated and decided in the.district
court under the caption Evans v. American Fed'n of Television & Radio
Artists, the cases were generally identified with William F. Buckley, Jr.,
and his name was utilized on appeal. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 1,
Buckley v. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 496 F.2d 305 (2d
Cir. 1974). Buckley and M. Stanton Evans are both known as articulate
exponents of a conservative political philosophy, and generally as speakers
on public affairs. Buckley appeared as the host participant of the television
show "Firing Line" on which he engaged in spirited discussion with guest
spokesmen of liberal persuasions. 496 F.2d at 308. National Review, Inc.,
a New York corporation wholly owned by Buckley which controls his services on television and radio, had joined Buckley as a plaintiff. Brief for
Plaintiffs-Appellees at 9. "Firing Line" was formerly produced and distributed pursuant to contracts among National Review, Inc., RKO General,
Inc. and Show Corporation of America, and broadcast by RKO stations
throughout the country. In 1971, production of the show continued under
a contract between National Review, Inc. and Southern Educational Communications Association. 354 F. Supp. at 828. Evans served as a participant on the radio series "Spectrum," a program on which a number of
spokesmen of differing political and social philosophies express their opinions on topics of their own choosing. 496 F.2d at 308. The contract that
Evans had made with CBS News to deliver regular commentaries on radio
was later amended to call for television commentary as well. Brief for
Plaintiffs-Appellees at 11.
2. See 354 F. Supp. at 841-45. Plaintiffs had moved the court to ad-
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amendment.3

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York ruled in plaintiffs' favor' and declared that any provisions
requiring plaintiffs to become members of AFTRA, pay dues, and
comply with any regulations incident thereto were void and of no
effect.' The court recognized that prior restraints upon constitutionally protected speech could not be sustained in the absence of a
competing and compelling necessity.' It concluded that the requirements of joining the union and paying dues were prior restraints on
the exercise of rights under the first amendment and that it was
inconsistent with the amendment for Congress to force someone to
agree in advance to such a limitation.7 The district court noted that
these principles are especially applicable to a discussion of public
affairs. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, 8 finding that there was no derogation of plaintiffs' constitutionally protected rights of free speech.' The Supreme Court denied certiorari.'
The employing parties with whom plaintiffs had negotiated their
judge that any provisions requiring them to be members of AFTRA, pay
dues and comply with any regulations incident thereto were void and of
no effect. Id. at 826; see text accompanying notes 15-16 infra.
3. Id. at 836-37.
4. Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was granted. Id. at 848.
5. Plaintiffs' motion for a permanent injunction was denied because
the court saw no reason to believe that AFTRA would not honor plaintiffs'
rights as declared. Id. at 849. The judgment was in all respects stayed
pending appeal. Id.
6. Id. at 845.
7. Id. at 842-43.
8. Id. at 845. The district court's findings were limited to commentators, such as plaintiffs, who expressed their personal opinions in broadcasts. Id. at 842.
9. Buckley v. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 496 F.2d
305, 310 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'g sub nom. Evans v. American Fed'n of Televison & Radio Artists, 354 F. Supp. 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
10. 95 S. Ct. 688 (1974). Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom the Chief
Justice joined, dissented from the denial of certiorari. Id. (dissenting
opinion); see notes 57-61 infra and accompanying text. The New York
Court of Appeals had rendered a decision in the case that became the
companion to Buckley on petition for certiorari. Lewis v. American Fed'n
of Television &Radio Artists, 34 N.Y.2d 265, 313 N.E.2d 735, 357 N.Y.S.2d
419, cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 688 (1974).
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contracts have collective bargaining agreements with AFTRA."
Those agreements incorporate AFTRA's Code of Fair Practice, requiring adherence to a union shop arrangement.12 AFTRA's constitution empowers the union's national board to discipline any member guilty of any act, omission or conduct which, in the opinion of
the board, is prejudicial to the welfare of AFTRA; 3 however, the
constitution does not prohibit any expression of opinion or other
form of communication by a member. 4
11. 496 F.2d at 308. National labor laws permit an exclusive bargaining
agent to represent each discrete employee bargaining unit; see, e.g., section
9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §
159(a)(1970). While plaintiffs had negotiated their own employment contracts directly with the broadcasters, courts have noted that the NLRA
does not countenance negotiating by individuals when they have
bargaining representatives. See, e.g., NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1, 44 (1937); Lion Oil Co. v. NLRB, 245 F.2d 376, 378 (8th Cir. 1957).
Plaintiffs nevertheless suggested that they were not within the collective
bargaining unit. Indeed, they intimated that negotiating with broadcasters
either directly or through talent agencies is the standard contemplated in
the TV Code of Fair Practice for artists who are engaged at terms over and
above the minimum. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 1, at 40.
Consequently, the issue arose as to whether plaintiffs were "free riders."
See notes 44-46 infra and accompanying text.
12. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 7-8, Buckley v. American Fed'n
of Television & Radio Artists, 496 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1974), sets out paragraph 84 of the current Code of Fair Practice. It provides in pertinent part
that subject to the NLRA, a party signatory to the Code will: "employ and
maintain in our employment only such persons covered by this agreement
as are members of the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists
in good standing or as shall make application for membership on the thirtieth (30th) day following the beginning of employment hereunder or the
date of execution of this agreement, whichever is the later, and thereafter
maintain such membership in good standing as a condition of employment. . .

."

Union shops are authorized, but not required, by section

8(a)(3) of the NLRA. See note 25 infra.
13. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 12, at 12 (wherein
Article XVIII, Section 1 of the AFTRA constitution was described).
AFTRA's constitution purports to impose upon its members responsibilities in excess of those contemplated by section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.
Id. at 7. But cf. Marlin Rockwell Corp., 114 N.L.R.B. 553, 561 (1955).
14. Id. at 12. Since much of plaintiffs' broadcast time constituted ex-
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Plaintiffs had in fact joined AFTRA so that they might continue
broadcasting. 5 Both plaintiffs were compelled to pay dues, and the
union also sought to impose upon them the terms and conditions of
subscribing to full-fledged membership." Plaintiffs claimed that
this compulsion was an unreasonable prior restraint upon their freedom of speech.' 7 AFTRA later acknowledged that plaintiffs could
avoid the imposition of the union's discipline "by resigning from
'full-fledged membership while continuing to pay dues.' ""i
The court of appeals concluded that rights secured by the first
amendment would remain inviolate despite the dues payments required by a union shop agreement."9 Thus it was not an infringement
of the commentators' rights of expression to compel them to pay
dues to a union. 0 However, the alleged infringements relating to
compulsory union membership and compliance with its incidental
regulations were construed to be "arguable" unfair labor practices
for which the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) had preemptive and exclusive jurisdiction.2
Since AFTRA is a private entity, the court of appeals in Buckley
had to determine whether the necessary government action was
established to provide federal jurisdiction and permit application of
the first amendment." Where conduct that is formally private has
pressions of their own opinions on diverse matters of public and social
concern, AFTRA could not act as a censor with respect to them or their
individual broadcasts.
15. 354 F. Supp. at 833-34.
16. The detailed facts and circumstances from which the litigation
arose are set forth in detail by the district court. Id. at 826-36.
17. In the opinion of the district court, this unconstitutional restraint
on protected speech obviated the necessity of declaring section 8(a)(3)
unconstitutional on its face in order to protect plaintiffs' rights. Id. at 847.
18. 496 F.2d at 312-13 n.5; see NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S.
734 (1963). The union further conceded that "the imposition of obligations
of membership other than dues-payment will depend on continued fullfledged membership, which . . .cannot be imposed on pain of loss of
employment." 496 F.2d at 312-13 n.5. See also notes 53-56 infra and accompanying text.
19. 496 F.2d at 310.
20. Id. at 310-11; see notes 48-52 infra and accompanying text.
21. 496 F.2d at 312; see notes 53-56 infra and accompanying text.
22. 496 F.2d at 309. Government action is a sine qua non in order to
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become so imbued with a governmental character, government action has traditionally been found.23 Plaintiffs contended 4 that since
AFTRA's Code of Fair Practice and union shop agreement were
authorized by section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA),25 the necessary government action was present." In support of this contention, plaintiffs relied upon Railway Employes'
Department v. Hanson,7 wherein the Supreme Court held that the
invoke the protection of the first amendment. Public Util. Comm'n v.
Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461 (1952); accord, International Ass'n of Machinists
v. Sandsberry, 277 S.W.2d 776, 780 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), aff'd, 295
S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 918 (1957). See also Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). Thus, a determination that there is
no government action would necessarily preclude any first amendment
analysis; the Constitution does not concern itself with a private party's
actions with respect to th exercise of speech.
23. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966); Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
24. 496 F.2d at 309.
25. Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970), provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute
of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted
by any action defined in this subsection as an unfair labor practice) to
require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the
thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective
date of such agreement, whichever is the later, (i) if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in section 159(a) of
this title, in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit covered by such
agreement when made .

.

. " See note 11 supra.

26. The court of appeals in Buckley acknowledged that plaintiffs'
theory was to subject the union shop agreement to constitutuonal scrutiny
and have the court rule that the dues requirement violated the first amendment. 496 F.2d at 309-10.
27. 351 U.S. 225 (1956). Plaintiffs also relied on Public Util. Comm'n
v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952), to establish a sufficiency of governmental
involvement. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 1, at 25. In Pollak,
the Court found significant the earlier decision of American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 401 (1950): "[W]hen authority derives
in part from Government's thumb on the scales, the exercise of that power
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Railway Labor Act provision comparable to section 8(a)(3) of the
NLRA8 transforms otherwise private union shop agreements into
government action." AFTRA, however, attempted to distinguish
Hanson by pointing out that the Railway Labor Act does not permit
the states to outlaw union shop provisions, 0 whereas section 14(b)
of the NLRA specifically declares that state right-to-work laws forbidding union shops may supersede NLRA section 8(a)(3).11
by private persons becomes closely akin, in some respects, to its exercise
by Government itself." 343 U.S. at 462 n.8.
28. Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970).
29. 351 U.S. at 232. "In other words, the federal statute is the source
of the power and authority by which any private rights are lost or sacrificed. The enactment of the federal statute authorizing union shop agreements is the governmental action on which the Constitution operates,
though it takes a private agreement to invoke the federal sanction ...
A union agreement made pursuant to the Railway Labor Act has, therefore, the imprimatur of the federal law upon it ....

"

Id. (citations and

footnote omitted).
30. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 12, at 15-21. Thus, there
would be no government action under the NLRA. Id.; cf. Otten v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 205 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 983
(1956).
31. "Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the
execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment in any State. . .in which such
execution or application is prohibited by State . . .Law." 29 U.S.C. §

164(b) (1970). The First Circuit ascribed little significance to the "displacement" of inconsistent state right-to-work laws as distinguishing the
NLRA and Railway Labor Act in deciding Linscott v. Millers Falls Co.,
440 F.2d 14 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971), and concluded,
noting Hanson, that a union shop agreement under the NLRA constituted
government action. Id. at 16. Linscott is jurisdictionally analagous to
Buckley in that it concerned the discharge of an employee who had refused to pay union dues because of religious scruples. Linscott held that
in weighing the burden on the employee against the congressionally supported principle of the union shop, the employee would be the one to suffer.
Id. at 18; see note 47 infra. The Tenth Circuit disagrees with the First and
has held that section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA does not render union shop
agreements government action. Reid v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 443
F.2d 408, 409-11 (10th Cir. 1971); cf. Otten v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 205 F.2d
58 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 983 (1956).
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The court of appeals in Buckley did not resolve the issue. It
adopted a more practical approach to establish jurisdiction. 2 Finding that plaintiffs had alleged a violation of the Constitution and
had satisfied the court that there was, on the merits, a justiciable
issue, the court of appeals assumed jurisdiction. 3 Thus, without
even reaching the government action question, the Second Circuit
upheld the district court's jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims that
AFTRA's dues requirement impinged upon plaintiffs' first amend3

ment rights.

4

It has long been established that the essential purpose of the first
amendment is to prevent prior restraints upon the exercise of
speech.35 Since speech itself is recognized as a fundamentally pre32. 496 F.2d at 310.
33. Id. Such a practical approach had been advocated in Bell v. Hood,
327 U.S. 678 (1946). In Bell, the Supreme Court held that federal jurisdiction (to adjudicate a claim on the merits) could be defeated only by a
showing that an alleged violation of the Constitution was really immaterial
to the practical resolution of the case. Id. at 682-83. Such a showing might
entail a demonstration that the claim was wholly insubstantial and frivolous or was raised solely for the purpose of achieving jurisdiction. Id. Where
the alleged constitutional violation forms the essence and sole basis of the
relief sought, a court would not be warranted to say that the cause was so
patently without merit as to justify dismissal. Id. at 683. Owing to the
closeness of the government action question, it was clear that the claim in
Buckley was not insubstantial. 496 F.2d at 310; see notes 24-31 supra and
accompanying text.
34. 496 F.2d at 310.
35. The constitutional prohibition against prior restraint was established in the now famous case of Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
In Near, the Court opined that a statute suppressing the publication of
allegedly malicious, scandalous, and defamatory matter could not be condoned, even though the publisher was permitted to show that the matter
published was true, and published with good motives and justifiable ends.
The Court stated: "The question is whether

. . .

restraint of publication

is consistent with the conception of the liberty of the press as historically
conceived and guaranteed. In determining the extent of the constitutional
protection, it has been generally, if not universally, considered that it is
the chief purpose of the guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publication." Id. at 713. While Near dealt with publication as a form of expression, the analogy to prior restraint upon speech as a form of expression
within the first amendment is sufficiently close to provide a parallel.
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ferred right, 0 'a compelling interest must be demonstrated to justify
a governmental incursion into the area of protected speech.37 The
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S.
569 (1941). The standard by which to measure and qualify abuse of speech
is whether it "create[s] a clear and present danger that .

.

. will bring

about the substantive evils than Congress has a right to prevent." Schenck
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)(Holmes, J.). Such speech is not
afforded protection by the first amendment under the clear and present
danger test. Id.; see Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
36. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945). "That priority gives
these liberties a sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." Id.
37. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). It would follow then
that any attempt to restrict these preferred liberties must satisfy a justification far above the so-called rational relationship test. Board of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943). To meet the rational relation test there
must simply be a rational connection between the remedy provided and
the evil to be curbed. See Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S.
389, 406 (1928)(Brandeis, J., dissenting); cf. Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson,
282 U.S. 499, 501 (1931). The compelling interest test for preferred liberties
demands the demonstration of a sufficient necessity to justify the governmental incursion upon the liberty. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969). The burden on first amendment rights imposed by calling newsmen
to testify before a grand jury was held to be justified by the fundamental,
compelling and paramount governmental interest in the role of the grand
jury in securing the safety of the person and property by the investigation
of crime. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). It may be beneficial to
note that the statute which was held to impose a prior restraint in Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945), required previous registration as a condition
for exercising first amendment rights. As a matter of principle, a requirement of registration in order to make a speech lawfully at a public assembly would seem incompatible with the first amendment. There were identified no dangers to an interest that the government was entitled to protect,
nor instruments of harm which would in any way mandate previous identification of speakers. Id. at 539. There is in the registration condition a
prior restraint that renders a chilling effect upon the exercise of first
amendment rights. Id. Not inapposite are the licensing cases which impose
conditions on the exercise of first amendment rights. In Lovell v. Griffin,
303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938), an ordinance prohibiting the distribution of any
literature at any time or place, or in any manner, without a permit was
held unconstitutional as striking at the very foundation of free expression
by subjecting it to license and censorship. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
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courts have recognized the necessity to afford full first amendment
protection to comment on public affairs. 8 By its very essence, freedom of speech embodies the right to discuss publicly all matters of
general concern. 9
U.S. 296, 306 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939); Hague
v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). But see
Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941), wherein a regulation
requiring the license for the use of streets for a parade was held to be a
valid exercise of control by local government as a means to safeguard
public order. The test utilized in Cox was whether control was exerted that
would unwarrantedly abridge the opportunities for the communication and
discussion normally associated with public places. Id. In 'addition, the
Court viewed the license fee to be "'not a revenue tax, but one to meet
the expense incident

. .

.

to the maintenance of public order in the matter

licensed.'" Id. at 577.
38. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Redrup
v. United States, 386 U.S. 767 (1967); cf. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516
(1945).
39. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940). Today, much
comment on public affairs takes place on television and radio. Since the
broadcast media utilize a scarce public resource in broadcast frequencies,
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) ensures fulfillment of
public obligations and a public trust. There is an unusual order of first
amendment values, evincing a desire to preserve the goal of unrestrained
private broadcast journalism under the regulatory scheme of the Federal
Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970). The "fairness doctrine," as this scheme has become known and embodied in statute, 47
U.S.C. § 315 (1970), imposes upon the broadcaster the responsibility of
adequate coverage of important public issues that fairly reflect differing
viewpoints. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94 (1973); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
The basic principle implicit in the fairness doctrine is an accomodation of
free speech. Thus, it affords the broadcaster wide journalistic freedom and
editorial discretion in regulating his programming, limited only by the
paramount public interest in fairness. See Jaffee, The EditorialResponsibility of the Broadcaster:Reflections on Fairnessand Access, 85 Haav. L.
REV. 768, 774 (1972). See also Comment, The FairnessDoctrine: Time for
the Graveyard?,2 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 563 (1974); Comment, The Regulation of Competing First Amendment Rights: A New Fairness Doctrine
Balance After CBS?, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1283 (1974). It might seem that
any limitation of a commentator's right to appear on television or radio
would be inconsistent with the fairness doctrine. Thus, plaintiffs in
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Conflicting with these first amendment interests 0 is the government's concern with labor relations. The federal government has
undertaken extensive regulation of labor-management relations.4'
National labor law permits an exclusive bargaining agent to represent each employee bargaining unit.4" To enable these agents to
fulfill their statutory responsibility of representation, courts have
held that it was the intent of Congress to permit the levying of
monetary dues upon all individuals in the bargaining unit.43
Buckley argued that commentators such as themselves were excluded from
the provisions of section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA because any obligation to
submit to AFTRA's discipline sanctioned by that section would have a
chilling effect upon first amendment rights and hence violate the fairness
doctrine; i.e., section 8(a)(3) could not abridge a licensee broadcaster's
obligations under the doctrine. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note
1, at 49-50. This particular contention was evaluated by the district
court in Buckley, 354 F. Supp. at 839-45, which concluded that plaintiffs were so situated as "to assert . . . the rights assured by Congress

[under the fairness doctrine] to hear broadcasts of commentary, analysis
and political opinion from diverse philosophic viewpoints." Id. at 841.
Since, in the opinion of the district court, plaintiffs experienced a chilling
effect upon the exercise of speech, there would also be a derogation of the
fairness doctrine. Id. at 842-45. The fairness doctrine was not however
alluded to in the decision of the court of appeals. This matter was considered by the New York Court of Appeals in Lewis v. American Fed'n of
Television & Radio Artists, 34 N.Y.2d 265, 277, 313 N.E.2d 735, 743, 357
N.Y.S.2d 419, 431-32 (1974): "The union shop provision in AFTRA's contract with Mutual [Broadcasting Company] might bar access of Mutual's
channels to plaintiff. .

.

. It would not limit his right to freely express his

views, or to utilize other channels or avenues not so bound by agreement."
40. In causing a chilling effect upon the exercise of speech, the process
might "[r]esult in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people." New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,
730 (1971)(Stewart, J., concurring).
41. E.g., the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-88
(1970).
42. See note 11 supra and cases cited therein. See also Ford Motor Co.
v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323
U.S. 192, 202 (1944). Such rights and obligations under the NLRA meet a
social and economic need and are within the power of Congress to guarantee. Lewis v. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 34 N.Y.2d 265,
277, 313 N.E.2d 735, 743, 357 N.Y.S.2d 419, 431 (1974).
43. Buckley v. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 496 F.2d
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Courts have also found the union shop desirable because it brings
about a fair sharing of the costs and financial burdens of collective
bargaining and union representation." A required tolerance of "free
riders," those who enjoy the benefits of the union's negotiating efforts without assuming a corresponding portion of its financial burden, would result in flagrant inequity and might eventually undermine the union's ability to perform its bargaining function.45 The
court of appeals in Buckley accepted the view that the public interest was served by having union shops.4" Specifically, it concluded
that the means Congress adopted to reduce industrial strife are
reasonable and do not "unwarrantedly abridge" free speech.47
305, 311 (2d Cir. 1974); Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225,
233 (1956); Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 19 7 1)
Cf. NLRB v. Textile Workers Local 1029, 409 U.S. 213, 221 (1972) (dissenting opinion): "Union activity, by its very nature, is group activity, and
is grounded on the notion that strength can be garnered from unity, solidarity, and mutual commitment." Id. at 221.
44. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 761-64
(1961); Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 1971); Lewis
v. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 34 N.Y.2d 265, 273, 313
N.E.2d 735, 741, 357 N.Y.S.2d 419, 428 (1974).
45. See, e.g., NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 740-43
(1963); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 761-62
(1961); Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 41 (1954). Even though
plaintiffs had negotiated their own contracts, and neither desired union
representation nor claimed substantial benefit from it, the court of appeals
in Buckley nevertheless deemed them to be free riders.
46. 496 F.2d at 311.
47. Id.; Lewis v. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 34
N.Y.2d 265, 277, 313 N.E.2d 735, 743, 357 N.Y.S.2d 419, 431 (1974). In
Linscott, it was noted that the interests involved were not merely those of
an individual plaintiff versus the cost to the federal treasury; opposed to
plaintiff's interests, rather, were both the public and private interest in
collective bargaining and industrial peace. 440 F.2d at 18. "There is no
rational basis for distinguishing between the degrees of benefit one enjoys
as a result of a union's bargaining efforts on his behalf." 496 F.2d at 312
(footnote omitted). The AFTRA collective bargaining agreements supersede the provisions of an individual contract where the bargaining
agreements are more favorable to the employee. Among other provisions,
the agreements give assurance against free replays and foreign use of programs, establish access to arbitration, and define safeguards with respect
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With respect to the first amendment challenge, the court of appeals based its analysis upon the premise that the finding of a
proper governmental purpose may justify imposing a restraint upon
free speech.48 Where a restraint is imposed in such circumstances,
there is no infringement of an unconstitutional dimension.49 This
proposition weighed heavily in the Buckley decision.50 Mandatory
union dues were justified as enabling a collective bargaining unit to
secure the objectives of peaceful labor relations.' The court of apto pay television. Such provisions might not be otherwise obtainable at
first, even by those situated as were plaintiffs with their own negotiation,
but are attributable to the collective strength of the union. Brief for
Defendant-Appellant, supra note 12, at 41-42. See also Gilbert, "Residual
Rights" Established by Collective Bargainingin Television and Radio, 23
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 102 (1958).
48. 496 F.2d at 311; see also Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569,
574 (1941); accord, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); see note 37
supra.
49. 496 F.2d at 311.
50. Id. This reasoning indicates that the requirement to pay dues, even
as to commentators who exercise first amendment rights as a profession,
in and of itself violates no rights of free expression. Id. The issue as to
whether union dues requirements work such a burden as to violate religious rights has been laid to rest in three circuits: Hammond v. United
Papermakers Union, 462 F.2d 174 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1028
(1972); Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 872 (1971); Gray v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 429 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971); Brief for Defendant-Appellant,
supra note 12, at 42. The New York Court of Appeals has ruled that there
was no constitutional infirmity in the compelled tender of union dues by
Fulton Lewis III, also a radio commentator on public affairs. Lewis v.
American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 34 N.Y.2d 265, 313 N.E.2d
735, 357 N.Y.S.2d 419, cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 688 (1974).
51. 496 F.2d at 311; see International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367
U.S. 740, 760 (1961); Lewis v. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 34 N.Y.2d 265, 271, 313 N.E.2d 735, 739, 357 N.Y.S.2d 419, 426 (1974).
Other courts have declared that union shop clauses are permissible as
contractual provisions in a collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g.,
Hammond v. United Papermakers Union, 462 F.2d 174, 175 (6th Cir.
1972); Lewis v. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 34 N.Y.2d
265, 275-76, 313 N.E.2d 735, 742, 357 N.Y.S.2d 419, 429-30 (1974). In the
absence of an unwarranted abridgement of constitutional rights in a particular case, reasonable union regulation of its members should be favored.
Reasonable dues and membership fees adjusted to the circumstances
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peals therefore found no unconstitutional restraint of speech. 2
Under the NLRA, an employee need only tender dues to protect
his job under a union shop arrangement.5 3 Thus, AFTRA could not
impose on plaintiffs the disciplinary requirements imposed upon
full-fledged members. 4 AFTRA's representations that "the ultimate penalty for failing to remain a 'full-fledged' member would be
. . .discharge from employment"5 would constitute an "arguable"
unfair labor practice if the union were to implement its threats."
have been approved. Id. It is settled law that union shop provisions in a
collective bargaining contract are valid under the commerce clause and
violates neither the due process clause nor any right of association conferred by the first amendment. Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S.
225, 238 (1956). It should be noted that where the exaction of dues is used
as a cover for forcing ideological conformity or other action in contravention of the first amendment, prior holdings to the effect that dues are not
constitutionally infirm would not prejudice the resolution of such a case.
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. at 748; Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238.
52. 496 F.2d at 311.
53. NLRB v. Textile Workers Local 1029, 409 U.S. 213 (1972); Radio
Officer's Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 40-42 (1954); NLRB v. Bell Aircraft
Corp., 206 F.2d 235, 238 (2d Cir. 1953); cf. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967). A union member has the right to refrain from
concerted activity. See section 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
54. This was ultimately conceded by AFTRA. Brief for DefendantAppellant, supra note 12, at 30; see also Lewis v. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 34 N.Y.2d 265, 276, 313 N.E.2d 735, 742, 357
N.Y.S.2d 419, 430 (1974). See also note 18 supra and accompanying text.
55. 496 F.2d at 312.
56. Id The court of appeals pointed out that AFTRA may have already
violated section 8(b)(1) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(1970), by
coercing Buckley into becoming a full-fledged member of the union. 496
F.2d at 313 n.5. The court held that federal district courts may not adjudicate matters of "arguable" unfair labor practices under the NLRA. Id. at
312. When such "arguable" unfair labor practices are alleged, the jurisdiction of federal courts is preempted and they "must defer to the exclusive
competence" of the NLRB. Id., citing San Diego Building Trades Council
v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959); accord, Amalgamated Ass'n of Street
Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971). See generally Cox, Labor
Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1337 (1972); Lesnick,
Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72
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Justice Douglas's dissent from the denial of certiorari57 points to
the significance of Buckley v. American Federation of Television
and Radio Artists. As Justice Douglas viewed the case, the salient
issue was whether a person suffers an infringement of his first
amendment rights when he is compelled to pay union dues (or their
equivalent) as a precondition to expressing his ideas through the
broadcast medium." He contended that there was a substantial
question as to whether the dues requirement constituted a prior
restraint upon free speech-a restraint that could not be constitutionally countenanced."9
COLUM. L. REV. 469 (1972). For a discussion of the preemption aspect of
the Buckley decision with respect to union security clauses, see 16 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. REV. 306, 314-23 (1975).
57. 95 S. Ct. 688 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 688 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas agreed with the
court of appeals that issues concerning disciplinary sanctions by the union
were not properly before a federal court. Id. at 688 n.1 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Judge Friendly had concurred in the result reached by the court of
appeals in Buckley, but he pointed out that the real thrust of plaintiffs'
argument seemed to be that the authorization of the union to dictate any
conduct (membership or discipline) was unconstitutional. 496 F.2d at 314
(concurring). Since the preemption doctrine does not apply to constitutional attacks on the NLRA, id.; Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427
F.2d 996, 1002-04 (9th Cir. 1970), plaintiffs had argued that such an allegation would be entitled to judicial consideration. Brief for PlaintiffsAppellees, supra note 1, at 52, 54. The Supreme Court has taken a skeptical attitude toward administrative agencies handling first amendment
claims, insisting on the utmost judicial expedition. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59-60 (1965). Judge Friendly however indicated in the
court of appeals that there would be no constitutional infirmity under
section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA since an employee need not accept fullfledged membership in a union under a union shop arrangement. 496 F.2d
at 314 (Friendly, J., concurring); see note 18 supra and accompanying
text.
59. 95 S. Ct. at 689 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas recalled
that prior related decisions had left open the possibility that a membership
or dues requirement might be imposed in contravention of the first amendment, id. (Douglas, J., dissenting), alluding to International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 774-75 (1961), and Railway Employes'
Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956). See note 51 supra. Suitable
formulas have been utilized to enable the employee to bear his share of the
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Justice Douglas also observed that in some respects, the requirement to pay dues under compulsion could be viewed as the functional equivalent of a "license" to speak.6" So construed, the exaction becomes a privilege tax imposed upon the pursuit of activities
whose enjoyment is secured by the first amendment."
Plaintiffs' situation represents the unique combination of the
broadcast journalist exercising first amendment rights as a profession.62 Given the nature of plaintiffs' position, the court of appeals
cost of collective bargaining while protecting him from being forced to
support activities of which he disapproved in violation of the first amendment. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 774-75
(1961). Though such an accomodation was afforded under the Railway
Labor Act, it should be noted that rail unions openly engage in political
activity. Id. at 769-70. Whether such a similar accomodation could be
effectuated in Buckley was a question that Justice Douglas felt might
properly be put before the Court for plenary consideration. 95 S. Ct. at 689
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
60. Id.
61. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 104, 114 (1943); Grosjean v.
American Press, Inc., 297 U.S. 233, 251 (1936). This approach had been
considered by the court of appeals in Buckley: "If there is any burden on
appellees' [plaintiffs'] free speech it would appear to be no more objectionable than a 'non-discriminatory [form] of general taxation' which can
be constitutionally imposed on the communication media." 496 F.2d at
311. It has been held, nevertheless, that an otherwise non-discriminatory
tax imposed upon those who exercise first amendment rights is invalid
when the intent is to burden the exercise thereof. Grosjean v. American
Press, Inc., 297 U.S. at 250. Justice Douglas also noted that enforcement
of union shop provisions may be said to "encourage" such agreements,
thus indicating that there might be government action present. 95 S.Ct.
at 688 (Douglas, J., dissenting); accord, Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S.
369 (1967); cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). But see
Driscoll v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 484 F.2d 682, 690-91
(7th Cir. 1973); Lewis v. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists,
34 N.Y.2d 265, 277, 313 N.E.2d 735, 743, 357 N.Y.S.2d 419, 431 (1974).
Justice Douglas added: "The fact that section 8(a)(3) [of the NLRA] is
phrased in permissive rather than mandatory terms would not, in and of
itself, prevent a finding of governmental action." 95 S.Ct. at 688 (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
62. Most union members do not earn a living through the exercise of
first amendment speech; "[t]here are a limited number of persons . . .
qualified . . .to be hired to discharge this public duty of fair and bal-
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could have decided in their favor without damaging most union
shop contracts." Case law suggests, for example, that "even a minimal payment designed solely to cover administrative costs may be
impermissible in a First Amendment context."6 The high level of
protection that has traditionally been afforded the exercise of unrestrained speech provides a sufficient basis for the district court's
decision. 5 The tension between protected speech and governmental
interest in promoting labor peace suggests that the court of appeals
may have.reached an undesirable result." On these peculiar facts,
it is unfortunate that the Supreme Court did not choose to review
anced presentation of competing viewpoints." Evans v. American Fed'n of
Television & Radio Artists, 354 F. Supp. 823, 841 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
63. Prior to 1966, commentators such as plaintiffs were excluded from
AFTRA's collective bargaining agreements. Id. at 829-30. Efforts to distinguish between those who rendered news services as commentators and
analysis and those who did not were abandoned. Section 75 of the 1966-69
Code of Fair Practice extended coverage "to all persons other than staff
newsmen rendering services in the field of news including . . . commentators and analysts . . . ." Id. at 831. This same coverage was contained

in the 1969-72 Code and remains effective. Id.
64. 95 S. Ct. at 689 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
65. See notes 35-40 supra and accompanying text. Despite the finding
by the court of appeals that the means adopted to reduce industrial strife
"do not 'unwarrantedly abridge' free speech," 496 F.2d at 311, the district
court had reasoned that the chilling effect was indeed real. 354 F. Supp.
at 842. The only nationwide strike called by AFTRA against broadcasting
networks occurred in 1967. A well known commentator, "Chet" Huntley,
did continue to broadcast during the strike. When AFTRA declined to
discipline Huntley for failing to honor the picket line, it was subsequently
viewed as a grave error by the then president of AFTRA, Mel Brandt. Id.
at 843. But see Lewis v. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 34
N.Y.2d 265, 277, 414 N.E.2d 735, 743, 357 N.Y.S.2d 419, 431 (1974); Brief
for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 12, at 41, 48-50 (as to the "speculative" nature of plaintiffs' allegations); cf. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1,
13-15 (1972).
66. 95 S. Ct. at 688 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Plaintiff Buckley intends
to petition the Supreme Court for a rehearing, hoping to impress upon it
the significance of the constitutional questions involved. Buckley, AFTRA:
What Next?, N.Y. Post, Jan. 18, 1975, at 26, col. 1; see NATIONAL REVIEW,
Jan. 31, 1975, at 92-93.
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the critical question which the case addressed-an unconstitutional
restraint of free speech."
Edwin M. Ceccarelli
67. 95 S. Ct. at 688 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The real thrust of plaintiffs' claim was that the totality of AFTRA's activities rendered the restraint upon free speech unconstitutional. Buckley v. American Fed'n of
Television & Radio Artists, 496 F.2d 305, 314 (Friendly, J., concurring).
The analysis by which the court of appeals isolated the dues requirement
from "the combined effect of all the incidents of union shop activities on
[plaintiffs]," and balanced its [the dues] effect on protected speech
against the government's labor interests, would tend to eviscerate the preferred position of first amendment rights. See 16 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv.
306, 323-24 (1975).

